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One of the most important topics in hazard and disaster related research is the 
effective reduction of vulnerability. Despite the fact that our knowledge about 
several physical and human dimensions of disasters has grown rapidly in recent 
decades, there is ample evidence that casualties and damages due to natural disasters 
have grown even faster. Apparently, there is no such formula like ‘more data = better 
knowledge = less casualties and damages’.  
Purpose of this paper is the identification of some potential reasons for this 
obvious dilemma. After briefly addressing selected social science concepts of 
hazards, disasters, and risks, it is argued that good research leads to – scientifically – 
good models and predictions, but not necessarily to ‘good’ decision-making meant to 
reduce vulnerability to hazards. Both physical and human factors need to be brought 
together. Furthermore, research should focus on those most vulnerable to hazards and 
disasters as real target beneficiaries.  
The identification of practical ways to enable decision makers to make more 





Without doubt, the field of disasters, risks, and hazard studies fascinates a fast 
growing academic community. Each disaster seemingly testifies again that there is a 
problem we have not yet fixed properly. Within this community, a rich variety of 
approaches can be found: some scholars want to reconstruct, others to predict; some 
want to observe and ‘understand’ (Verstehen’), others to intervene. At least with 
reference to geohazards or ‘natural’ hazards and disasters in general, the fascination 
of the object of research – in one way or another – does not derive solely from its 
awfulness. Many are allured by the concept that the research object includes both 
nature and society, man and environment. Society usually does not belong to the 
‘classical’ research objects of engineers, geologists, hydrologists, geo-morphologists 
or specialists in volcanoes and earthquakes. Vice versa, current social and cultural 
perspectives are not designed to comprehend nature ‘as it really is’, but rather 
semantic fields of the term ‘nature’.  
The field of hazards and disasters is rich in ironies. Funding for prevention 
and mitigation is much easier to receive after a disaster – although evident that the 
returns would have been higher if efforts in prevention and mitigation had started 
already before the last disaster. The history of recovery and reconstruction after a 
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disaster is rich in examples where people did the same as they did before. However, 
does the return to the status quo ante not mean that the same calamity will occur 
again, one day or another? Some refer to this as the “disaster-damage-repair-cycle“ 
(Tobin and Montz 1997). Into the same direction points the notion of the so called 
„hydro-illogical cycle“ (National Drought Mitigation Center 1998). Since more than 
sixty years, we have written testimony that efforts meant to minimise losses due to 
natural events might, in the end, increase the total sum of such losses instead. In 
1937, when he was a young officer of the National Resources Planning Board, 
Gilbert White made clear: Floods exceeding the design limits of dykes will cause 
greater damage than would have occurred in the absence of such protective structures 
(Platt 1986: 48-49). This contiguity does mean not less than: By intending to make 
the flood plain a safer place we stimulate investments which, one day, will show up 
in the loss figures. Without such structural means, fewer investments had had been 
made in the flood plain in question. 
Everybody involved in the hazard- and disaster scene knows such examples. 
They show: If the aim of research on hazards, risk and disasters was the effective 
reduction of the number of casualties and losses, we must admit that we failed – at 
least, on the global level.  
Many have argued that the problem’s complexity exceeds the capacity of a 
single discipline and that interdisciplinary work is a necessity. Unfortunately, there 
are massive hindrances to a true and honest interdisciplinary success. Still basic 
terms like ‘disaster’ and ‘risk’, ‘natural event’ and ‘hazard’ are used as if referring to 
age-old empirical realities that are self-evident (Hewitt 1998: 76). Eric Waddell 
(1983: 38) referred to hazard research as an “ideological battlefield” already in 1983, 
and since then the rifts between the manifold paradigms have appeared to be widened 
– no matter of IDNDR or similar programs. To make things worse, behind these 
terms and their manifold meanings lay, mostly implicitly, world-views, underlying 
assumptions and over-simplifications.  
The traditional formulation of the problem is quite close to commonplace 
perspectives: Disasters are discrete phenomena, believed to be external to social 
systems upon which they impinge. This approach holds that disasters and society are 
related to each other in a cause-and-effect-manner (Blaikie et al. 1994). Perspectives 
like that are challenged increasingly, mainly by social scientists. 
 
 ‘Natural Disasters’? 
 
April this year saw the 30th anniversary of a paper published in Nature by Phil 
O’Keefe, Ken Westgate, and Ben Wisner (1976), celebrated in modesty by the Radix 
website (http://www.radixonline.org). The title of the paper in question is “Taking 
the Natural Out of 'Natural Disasters’”. Possibly this was the first peer-reviewed 
paper decidedly refusing the idea of “Natural Disasters”. The authors argue that such 
a distinction between natural and technological hazards was misleading. Even more, 
this taxonomy is accused to perpetuate the ideology of a nature separate from society 
and encouraging a belief in natural disasters as inevitability. As opposed to natural 
events, hazards and disasters are, from such a perspective, by definition social:  
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“The time is ripe for some form of precautionary planning which considers 
vulnerability of the population as the real cause of disaster – a vulnerability 
that is induced by socio-economic conditions that can be modified by man, and 
is not just an act of God. Precautionary planning must commence with the 
removal of concepts of naturalness from natural disasters.” (O'Keefe et al. 
1976: 567) 
By closer examination, earlier examples of the argument can be found. Exactly 400 
years before O’Keefe, Westgate and Wisner published the paper mentioned, a man in 
Cairo was deeply impressed by the great earthquake in Cairo early in the morning of 
the April 2nd, 1576. Ibn Al-Jazzar was his name. Since he was not satisfied by the 
standard explanations of that time, he elaborated the idea of building houses in a way 
that they would not collapse when the ground shakes (Taher 1979, quoted from 
Schulze 2004: 111). He suggested that earthquakes were god’s will, and man should 
keep silence about their possible objects. To him it was unambiguous that earth-
quakes meant ordeals for humans. Nevertheless, he argued, that the fatal 
consequences of earthquakes can be minimized by – first – the right moral conduct 
and – second – by better building techniques (Schulze 2004: 104). We can read this 
early scholar as an example for the idea that calamities do not just result from fate, 
and a deity’s will but from human behaviour, values, and decisions.  
In the year of 1932, a social scientist published a similar argument in the 
United States: 
“Not every windstorm, earth-tremor, or rush of water is a catastrophe. A 
catastrophe is known by its works; that is, to say, by the occurrence of disaster. 
So long as the ship rides out the storm, so long as the city resists the earth-
shocks, so long as the levees hold, there is no disaster. It is the collapse of the 
cultural protections that constitutes the disaster proper.” (Carr 1932: 211; 
quoted from Dombrowsky 1998: 24) 
At least in geographical thought, from the outset of modern hazard research it was 
conceived as axiomatic that features of the environment can only be regarded as a 
hazard as long as it does (or could) affect man and his possessions. An earthquake in 
the desert affecting not a single person might be an extreme and extraordinary event, 
but neither a hazard nor a disaster (White 1974).  
Interestingly, at least in Germany the affected parts of the public are very 
sensitive to the question of causation of disasters. The 1997 deluge of the Odra River 
was identified by politicians and by media as once-in-a-millennium-flood, as ‘natural 
disaster’. Interviews with people affected by this flood showed that they hardly felt 
as ‘victims of nature’. Nobody challenged the idea of naturalness of high water 
levels. However, what, from their perspective, needed an explanation, was: Why did 
the dyke did not protect them this time, if it did so for so many years? Many were 
believed to be responsible for their calamities: Why did the authorities neglect the 
dyke’s maintenance? Why this contradictory early warnings, why this overall 
incompetence in initial emergency response management, why this inconsistent 
evacuation appeals? Looking upstream, many felt as victims of forest dieback and 
omitted reforestations, of ongoing sealing due to construction, of river regulation and 
wrong management of retention basins and so on (Felgentreff 2000; 2003). No 
matter if a decision-maker is identifiable or not: Important is that people ascribe their 
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calamities to decisions (Pohl 1998) – usually to decisions made by third parties, but 
not oneself.  
 
While some researchers interested in hazards and disasters conceptualise all kinds of 
disasters regardless of their assumed (man-made or so-called natural) trigger as 
problems of purely corporate integration, others keep to the idea of critical relations 
between man and environment. However, for social scientists the focus of interest 
does not lie in the analysis of environmental problems as such, but in the question 
how they are treated; in this case on how societies and their subgroups deal with 
hazards and disasters.  
“Since about fifteen years ago, however, a new perspective has emerged that 
views hazards as basic elements of environments and as constructed features of 
human systems rather than extreme and unpredictable events, as they were 
traditionally perceived. When hazards and disasters are viewed as integral parts 
of environmental and human systems, they become a formidable test of societal 
adaptation and sustainability. In effect, if a society cannot withstand without 
major damage and disruption a predictable feature of its environment, that 
society has not developed in a sustainable way.” (Oliver-Smith 1996: 304) 
Because of such arguments, many social scientists refrain from the usage of the term 
‘natural disaster’ (Pelling 2001). From a social perspective it is structural and 
systemic – but nonetheless man-made – causes that generate disasters (Blaikie et al. 
1994: 11). In fact, one can hardly think of disasters that are not linked to human 
presence, action and decision-making, in one way or another.  
 
All this reasoning about the social causes of disasters is similarly applicable to the 
hazard concept. To most natural scientists and engineers, hazard refers to a feature of 
environment, to a natural event. The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
(ISDR) defines a ‘Geological hazard’ as… 
“Natural earth processes or phenomena that may cause the loss of life or injury, 
property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental 
degradation.  
Geological hazard includes internal earth processes or tectonic origin, such as 
earthquakes, geological fault activity, tsunamis, volcanic activity and emissions 
as well as external processes such as mass movements: landslides, rockslides, 
rock falls or avalanches, surfaces collapses, expansive soils and debris or mud 
flows. 
Geological hazards can be single, sequential or combined in their origin and 
effects.” (ISDR n.d.) 
Again, the counter-argument is that not the process itself is the hazard, but only in 
relation to material assets, values or lives exposed to the process or phenomenon in 
question. That means, the concept of hazard includes two dimensions, the 
physical/environmental and the human/social. Neglecting the social context can 





In engineering terms, it is the combination of the vulnerability of the built 
environment and the hazard that creates the risk specific to a hazard, e.g. the 
earthquake risk (Somerville and Leith 2006). In this sense, vulnerability “…means 
the degree of loss to a given element at risk or set of such elements resulting from the 
occurrence of a natural phenomenon of a given magnitude” (Granger 2000: 3). 
Following such an understanding of the term vulnerability, it is often measured on a 
scale from 0 to 1.  
What appears almost as monolithic in the sphere of natural sciences and 
engineering (Glade 2004) is a contested field in the realm of social sciences, where 
dozens of different concepts of social vulnerability compete (e.g. the overview 
provided by Weichselgartner 2002). At least for social geographers influential was 
and still is the definition that Ben Wisner and his co-authors suggested:  
“By vulnerability we mean the characteristics of a person or group and their 
situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and 
recover from the impact of a natural hazard (an extreme natural event or 
process).” (Wisner et al., 2004, p. 11; italics in original) 
It is clear that such a concept of vulnerability is difficult to handle empirically. For 
instance, how a person or a group will recover after a calamity is hardly predictable 
in detail and can be analysed only in retrospect. Although rare and restricted to 
material dimensions, there are cases where households were much better off after a 
destructive ‘natural disaster’ – can we call them as ‘vulnerable’? Examples can be 
found in the German Odra River valley where formerly small and sub-standard 
houses badly affected by the 1997 Odra River flood soon got retrofitted and 
modernized with the assistance of insurers, donations made by the public and by 
state compensation schemes. Observers like neighbours assume, many houses are 
much more luxury since then (Felgentreff 2000).  
 
Since the 1970s, many studies indicated the crucial significance of societal 
conditions in disasters:  
“Material losses were often disproportionately concentrated according to age, 
gender, occupation, social position and, above all, lack of wealth and political 
voice. Even the effectiveness of risk assessment, warnings and emergency 
preparedness, depended most on whether or how they are (least) available to 
those most in need of them.” (Hewitt 1998: 77) 
Cases illustrating the relationship between socio-economic status and the distribution 
of human casualties are numerous – see the consequences of Hurricane Katrina 
(SSRC 2005). Although not applicable to each societal context, it remains a truism 
that it is generally the poor who suffer more than the rich do. Vulnerability is not 
identical with poverty, but often highly correlated (Wisner et al. 2004: 12). 
 
Colin Green (2004) makes an interesting point in stressing that most versions of the 
term vulnerability constitute a conjunction … 
“… relating something or someone who is vulnerable to something else as a 
source of potential harm because of some property of the subject or the object. 
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Vulnerability implies something therefore about the relationship between the 
subject and the object as well as the relevant characteristics of either or both 
the object and the subject of the argument. The meaning of ‘vulnerability’ may 
thus be context specific rather than being a universal concept. What we mean 
by ‘vulnerability’ may consequently depend upon the nature of the decision 
that must be made and what the decision involves.” (Green 2004: 323-324)  
Following this understanding, at the start the desired state sought to achieve or 
maintain needs definition. Consequently, what the hazard is follows from the 
definition of desirability, but is not objectively present (Green 2004: 324). 
There are good reasons to regard vulnerability as the basic problem. From a 
social science perspective, it appears as being a social problem, which cannot be 
fixed just by technical means. Even if one argues that the problem with hazards and 
disasters was many people’s lack of problem-solving capacities due to a lack of 
technical fixes, the question “Who is responsible for such a lacking” would remain. 
“Instead of answering that question, it is much easier to turn causality toward the 
overwhelming forces coming from outside.” (Dombrowsky 1998: 24)  
 
Decisions and decision-makers 
 
Provided that decisions are ‘good’, they can bring about effective reduction of 
vulnerability (Sarewitz and Pielke n.d.: 13), whereby their capacity to reduce 
vulnerability is difficult to measure.  
Not just professional decision-makers like politicians make decisions relevant 
to the creation and reduction of vulnerability. The decision of how to allocate money, 
time and energy must be made each day by everybody and each household. Each 
decision implies risks, not least because failure might be accredited to the person 
held responsible for the decision. A homeowner in an earthquake-prone region 
deciding to completely rebuild and upgrade his home according to earthquake safety 
regulations acts exemplary in the light of disaster prevention. Socially and culturally, 
he might fail to meet basic standards when this investment means he cannot afford to 
pay his children’s tuition fee anymore.  
In many places worldwide, the likelihood of car theft, crop failure, 
unemployment or burglary is much higher as compared to losses related to storms, 
flooding or landslides. Although being very different types of extreme events, their 
consequences and outcomes are similarly unwanted (Sarewitz and Pielke n.d.: 4). 
Since resources are always limited, decision-makers face the problem of how to 
allocate these resources properly between the different hazards (Green 2004: 326).  
This problem applies not just to households but also to other levels of decision-
making. As Philip H. Berke observed:  
“Natural hazard issues are usually given low priority on local government 
agendas. Low priority, however, is not necessarily due to a lack of awareness. 
Research findings from surveys of risk perception indicate that the general 
citizenry and key decision-makers (planners, building officials, public works 
engineers, and so forth) are aware of hazards, but put a low priority on taking 
action, and have little concern for doing so.” (Berke 1998: 79)  
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What – with reference to the reduction of vulnerability to one particular type of 
unwanted event – appears as questionable and is sometimes labelled as bounded 
rationality might in real world terms be the result of the necessity to minimize over-
complexity. Generally, knowledge about single risks has proven to be only a weak 
predictor for their individual assessment (Wildavsky 1993: 194). 
Often people do neither know nor believe what could happen to them. In 
Germany, apparently only a small portion of floodplain dwellers is aware that a flood 
exceeding the design of the structural protection will affect their house. Even more, if 
there is a dyke between the house and the water, from a legal point of view in 
Germany, this house is not at risk of flooding at all and no specific building 
standards are mandatory. In other context, many groups and individuals do not have 
any leeway for alternative decisions at all; they can hardly be blamed for ‘bad’ 
decisions.  
Decision makers – including ‚ordinary people’ – should have access to all 
sort of relevant knowledge and information. The questions are, what exactly means 
relevant, how should information be formatted in order to become useful, and what 
can be done to make sure they end up in ‘good’ decisions in the above-mentioned 
sense? Answers to these questions will be difficult to obtain, but Sarewitz and Pielke 
(n.d.) have made worthwhile suggestions for a framework for research and policy. 
The basic requirement is that useable and appropriate knowledge can be generated. 
In this respect, we might witness progress in future. 
 
Grasping the ‘big picture’?  
 
On another level, another problem arises. It is systemic and structural in nature and 
cannot be abolished just by better practice: It is widely accepted that reduction of 
vulnerability is achievable through several ways and the combination of different 
measures – before and after the impact, avoidance of ‘hazardous’ terrain or by 
manipulation and hopefully preventing of the triggering process. Who can rightfully 
claim to have the definite answer to the question, which combination of measures in 
which dose was the appropriate in a given context, for presence and future?  
Having the ongoing academic disputes about environmental controversies in 
mind, Daniel Sarewitz recently argued against the “… old-fashioned idea that 
scientific facts build the appropriate foundation for knowing how to act in the 
world.” (Sarewitz 2004: 385) The same argument has been raised with reference to 
ecosystem management:  
“More information provides an ever-larger pool out of which interested parties 
can fish differing positions on the history of what has led to current 
circumstances, on what is now happening, on what needs to be done, and on 
what the consequences will be. And more information often stimulates the 
creation of more options, resulting in the creation of still more information” 
(Michael 1995: 473, quoted from Sarewitz 2004: 389). 
Further options to reduce vulnerability will develop with further information and 
insights that are more penetrating than today. The more measures available, the 
greater the chance to fail by recommending some and neglecting other options. As 
scientists, we can never rely on eternal validity of our knowledge. Each such 
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recommendation implies the risk of turning out to be wrong, since each casualty, and 
even damage, will count as counter-evidence difficult to justify. We can keep this 
risk low by different strategies; e.g., conducting ‘good’ science according to our 
profession’s standards and keeping our horizon restricted to the process in question, 
blinding out practical issues of vulnerability reduction and potential research 
beneficiaries.  
On this road, we will not come that far in respect to vulnerability reduction. 
We should aim to do something about all floods and not about some, all earthquakes 
and not just the minor. The residual risk is not identical with the so-called accepted 
risk, but both are perfect prerequisites for the disasters of tomorrow.  
Future will always be uncertain in that sense that nobody ever can exclude 
everything unwanted and negative occurring to him in future. However, this overall 
uncertainty appears as only a minor portion of the problem. Global population 
development is an instructive example provided by James Jackson: In twenty years, 
the cities of developing countries will have about two billion more residents. It can 
be taken for granted that a large proportion of these additional city dwellers will 
reside in regions known to be notoriously earthquake-prone. One thing is certain, 
good buildings save lives in earthquake-prone terrain. If only little can be done to 
retrofit all already existing buildings in these cities, was it not a good idea to at least 
make sure that construction of the houses to be built is adequate (Jackson 2006)? 
What exactly will happen when the next massive earthquake rocks the Teheran 
region with its 14 millions inhabitants (Anonymous 2005: 7) is unthinkable and far 
beyond our imagination. Nevertheless, what appears as unthinkable in terms of its 
awfulness is, according to tectonic expertise and likelihood, very likely to happen 
one day, eventually.  
Carefully considered, Green’s above-mentioned argument (what the hazard 
is, is the consequence of the definition of desirability) demands for all-embracing 
visions. They would not only include answers to questions like what desirable living 
conditions mean for whom and touch on concepts of quality of life, but also on 
ethical issues like justice and human rights. Apart from attempts like the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency website “Ready Kids” (FEMA n.d.), hazard texts 
remain remarkable silent in this respect. Instead, the stock of literature ties up to 
implicit and commonsense value judgements (e.g. alive is better than dead, sane is 
better than sick, functional better than smashed and broken). Surely, strong 
arguments can be positioned against the formulation of such ample visions, e.g. that 
it would overstrain the professional domain of perhaps all single academic 
disciplines. On the other hand, the call for action is plain to see. Although it is clear 
that the results will always remain unsatisfactory, second-best solutions are better 
than completely neglecting of disasters ahead.  
Such research would require changes in science policy. So far, ‘best’ science 
is defined primarily by criteria inherent to the research system. In most cases, merits 
derived from ‘good’ models and predictions will outdo those for research 
successfully enabling decision-makers to make ‘good’ decisions. Public value of 
science would benefit from research programs considering additional criteria and 
incentives. As Sarewitz and Pielke (n.d.: 13) suggested, the understanding of the 
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decision contexts in the realm of vulnerability reduction in face of extreme events 




As demonstrated, from a social perspective, origins of disasters can be seen in 
crushing of human relations and social vulnerability instead of natural and external 
agents beyond society. Seemingly, terms like ‘disaster’, ‘hazard’, and ‘vulnerability’ 
are intrinsically contextual. They refer not just to physical and ‘objective’ events but 
also to human perception of consequences. Studying solely the physical dimensions 
and letting the respective social context aside can never produce more than 
fragmentary knowledge.  
This is not to say that it should become an assigned task for engineers to solve 
problems, which, as pointed out, can be comprehended as being social problems. The 
decision-making process tackling with options to reduce vulnerability should be 
rigorously paid tribute to. Decisions are not yet understood to be central research 
issues in the field of hazards, disasters, and vulnerability.  
Although difficult to achieve and perform, interdisciplinary work could be a 
cure against attempts to hide unaware or knowingly societal aspects in ‘black boxes’. 
Supplementary to meeting disciplinary standards for ‘good’ scientific conduct, 
studies dealing with vulnerability should take those into account who are most at 
risk. They are not the ordering party for scientific expertise, but they should belong 
to its first beneficiaries. 
What people do or fail to do about features of their environment identified as 
dangerous will be a reflection of how they choose among competing values. And the 
more knowledge and options become available, the more decisions have to be made 
– decisions which always include the possibility of failure.  
Making such choices for other people is not what scientists are expected to 
do. Instead, it is the job of democratic politics and of the people themselves. Science 
can at most direct attention to problems and help to understand how to achieve goals 
– for instance, the goal to reduce social vulnerability. To accomplish the goal of a 
disaster-resistant society is a continual task that will never be finally accomplished, 
and the avenues to reach it often collide with other goals. 
In the end, we face multiple uncertainties. Not just that future is always 
contingent and uncertain. To make things worse, as scientist we can never be certain 
that our knowledge is ‘good’ in terms of vulnerability reduction. Nor will there be 
ever something as certainty, whether or not decision-makers will derive ‘good’ 
decisions from this knowledge. The implications of these interactively entailing 
uncertainties are hardly to overlook. Nevertheless, these implications might be very 
close to the root of the problem – that globally we lose increasingly in the context of 
so-called ‘natural disasters’, while more and more data, information, and knowledge 
is accumulated. 
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